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Abstract—There is increasing interest in verifiable Internet
voting systems that enable voters to verify the integrity of
their vote on the voting platform prior to casting it, and any
interested party to verify the integrity of the election results.
The ease with which a vote can be verified plays a key role.
Empowering individual voters to act as interested yet objective
verifiers increases the probability of fraud detection. Verifying
constitutes additional effort, something humans resist unless the
benefits are compelling enough. Thus, what is the best way to
provide such motivation? We report on a survey, distributed
to 123 respondents, in which we explore the effects of three
types of motivating messages on voters’ intention to verify a
vote, using a smartphone app. The motivating messages were
intended to increase the intention to verify a vote. Our findings
have persuaded us that further research on the use of motivating
messages in the context of verifiable voting is warranted.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is increasing interest in the deployment and use of
Internet voting in legally-binding elections, for example, it has
been used since 2007 in the Estonian parliamentary elections
[22]. Voters are also interested in the use of Internet voting: a
recent survey in Germany [1], where voting machines were
rejected, reported that 51% of voters would vote over the
Internet for federal elections.
Most of the Internet voting systems in use are so-called
black box systems, i.e. voters are expected to trust that the
voting system and indeed their own voting environment (e.g.
their laptop) are neither deliberately malicious nor unwittingly
compromised. To deal with some of these challenges, secu-
rity researchers have proposed a number of verifiable voting
protocols to enable voters to verify the integrity of their votes
and the election results, while still providing vote secrecy due
to the cryptographic primitives that are used. These protocols
enable voters to verify that their votes are not modified prior
to being sent from the voting platform to the voting server
(cast as intended), stored unaltered in the electronic ballot
box (stored as cast), and counted in the final tally, without
modification (tallied as stored). With these provisions it is no
longer necessary to blindly trust the Internet voting system.
Verifiable voting systems are in use both in academic
and national contexts, for example, a verifiable voting system
was used to elect the university president at the Universiteˆ
catholique de Louvain in March 2009 [2], while e-voting
trials were carried out in 2011 and 2013 in Norway [59],
[43]. Ideally, the verifying steps could be delegated to a
trusted third party (such as a university, a political party,
security agencies, or international election observer bodies,
such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE)). However, not all the verifiability steps can
be delegated: specifically, the individual voter has to verify
that his or her vote is cast as intended, in order to preserve
vote secrecy. Further, two potential challenges could waylay
the verifiability aspect. The first is that the voter may find the
process too difficult, and the second is that he or she may
not see the need to verify, especially since it requires them to
expend extra effort.
While it is unfortunate that many of the proposed systems
require additional (often cumbersome) steps for verifying,
efforts to improve the usability of verifiability in the Helios
voting protocol1, demonstrate that it is indeed possible to
iteratively improve the verifiability step, making it simpler for
voters [3], [67], [29], [28].
Verifying a vote constitutes extra effort, no matter how easy
it is to do. It is well known that users minimize effort wherever
they can [68], [7]. Since voters often do not perceive a need to
verify, due to their trust in the people and processes involved,
and the overall election system [41], they are not likely to be
motivated to do so. In this paper, we focus our attention on
this challenge.
The question we wanted to answer was: ‘Could a specially
tailored message increase the intention to take up this verifi-
ability opportunity?’ At the outset, we acknowledge that our
goal is to influence behavioural intention, but we know that
such an intention does not always convert to actual behaviour.
On the other hand, intention is definitely a necessary precursor
to actual behaviour [34], and it is thus worth focusing attention
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and effort in this direction.
To this end, we identified a number of behaviour-changing
theories and models. We summarized and grouped the findings
into several categories, from which we deduced three types
of motivating messages: those based on risk theories, those
based on norm theories, and approaches utilizing analogies.
The messages were tested in a survey with 123 German
respondents, where we measured the effect on respondents’
reported intention to verify and subsequent intention to vote
online (to ensure that we had not compromised this pre-existing
intention.) We found that the motivational messages did indeed
influence German voters’ intention to verify, without nega-
tively affecting their pre-existing intention to vote online. As
a result, we can recommend further investigation into the use
of motivating messages in the context of verifiable voting, to
increase the likelihood that vote manipulation will be detected.
Further research is also necessary to investigate questions
arising from this work.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: first, we
present related work in Section II, before discussing the
literature review on behaviour change in information security,
our findings, and how these were applied to design motivating
messages. In Section III we present the survey developed
to evaluate the designed messages, the results obtained in
Section IV, and the implications for verifiable voting systems
in Section V. We then conclude with open questions for future
work in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In the literature, we find that the primary focus in us-
ability evaluations of verifiable voting systems has been to
instruct voters to check their votes. Studies of electronic
voting machines revealed that instructions were not successful
[13], neither were monetary incentives [53]. Hence, knowledge
of how to verify and extrinsic rewards had little effect. In
the context of electronic voting machines, emphasizing the
verifying step in the context of review screens increased the
number of participants who detected errors [20], [11]. User
studies of verifiable voting systems have also concentrated on
instructing participants on the steps to carry out, both in polling
station based systems [38], [55], [51] and remote verifiable
voting systems [67], [28].
A lot of research has also been carried out in the usable
security field with respect to users acting securely. The efficacy
of instructions is seen to vary depending on the application
context, for example, users appreciate instructions how to
create strong passwords [49], but where the instructions are
complex, may suffer the discomfort [6] or opt out, for ex-
ample, in [47]. The authors in [7], [24], and [30] point to
the economic perspective in users’ decision making as they
evaluate whether to comply or not based on a cost benefit
analysis, in cases where conflicts arise between their day-to-
day tasks and security, or more effort is asked of them than
they deem necessary.
Our work differs from existing research in that we seek
to design motivating messages and to test their effect on
voters’ intention to verify. The messages are designed based on
existing theories of behaviour change. A control group will act
as a baseline, receiving straightforward instructions to verify,
similar to current practice reported in the voting literature.
A. Behaviour-Change in Information Security
We report on the literature review carried out to identify
behaviour-change theories and models, and the findings that
were then used to develop motivating messages.
1) Literature Review: Using the methodology in [31], we
searched for literature using the terms ‘behaviour change’
and ‘information security’. From notable research repositories
providing access to peer-reviewed literature [36], we iden-
tified papers published from the year 2000 to date. Those
lacking empirical tests were excluded. Backward references
[36] provided further publications. One of the authors of a
recent literature review [34] provided an appendix of literature
focused on motivating information security policy compliance
in organizations. By cross-referencing papers in this appendix
with the literature already identified, we included 20 new pa-
pers. The remaining papers had either already been identified,
did not contain empirical work, or only had abstracts readily
available.
A total of 135 papers were identified and reviewed. To
extract data, we noted the theories and methodologies applied;
the number of respondents recruited; how the approaches were
applied: e.g. to develop a specific message; the context of
use: e.g. home computer users or employees; and noteworthy
findings applicable to our work.
2) Identified Categories: Twenty-eight identified theories
and models were then categorized inductively into five groups.
The theories and models generally have multiple individual
constructs. A single construct can be operationalized as several
variables for evaluation. In the literature, we found that either
a single theory with multiple constructs, a single theory and
individual constructs from other theories, or single constructs
from a given theory, were applied. Where such cases were
identified, the individual constructs were grouped along with
the original theory or model, or categorized based on the
element the authors concentrated on. As an example, while
the Health Belief Model has been used to increase perception
of threats and coping appraisal in order to change behaviour
and is therefore classified under the Risk category, perceived
susceptibility (a single construct from the model) was used in
[18] to train respondents not to fall for phishing attacks. The
final categories are listed below, along with descriptions and
examples from literature.
• Risk — Change behaviour by providing information
about existing risks or threats and how to cope, for
example, the Protection Motivation Theory [4].
• Training — Change behaviour using training programs
or security messages developed using learning theories
[46].
• Rewards/Penalties — Change behaviour by rewarding
“desired” behaviours [44] or penalizing “undesired”
behaviours [23]. The rationale here is that users eval-
uate cost (effort) and benefit in deciding whether or
not to carry out an action [7].
• Norms — Change behaviour by informing people of
the behaviours of others, emphasizing the descriptive
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norm and using human tendencies to imitate others’
behaviours, to encourage particular behaviours [56].
We identified another potential theory, that of analogies.
While this has not been used in security research before, it
did seem to have potential in this context, therefore it was
included.
• Analogies — Analogies exploit the direct personal
experience of the person, and point out the links
between a new idea and the existing experience, easing
the instructional process [12]. In this case behaviour
is changed by establishing links with previous knowl-
edge and thereby improving understanding.
It is interesting to note the focus of these categories. Train-
ing attempts to address lack of knowledge about the process
itself, analogies build on knowledge in a similar context.
Norms impart knowledge about what other people do, and risk
focuses on potential consequences of fraudulent behaviours
of others. Rewards and penalties introduce additional artificial
consequences into the equation.
B. Developing Behaviour-Change Messages
The first consideration in testing the message effects was
how such messages should be delivered. A message utilizing
images, sound or video would be very effective but would
have to be delivered via a supporting platform. Unfortunately
there is always the possibility that the voting platform has been
compromised [50], thus delivering instructional messages this
way seems insecure 2. Hence we designed messages which
could easily be delivered via a secure channel (e.g. postal
mail). In this case they would have to be primarily textual.
There is evidence that textual messages can be effective in
motivating secure behaviour [4], [32], [64] so we considered
this a reasonable compromise.
1) Excluded Categories: Our objective was to test a mes-
sage belonging to each category identified in Section II-A.
Some, however, were unsuitable. Here we explain why they
were excluded.
Since verifying of votes cast via the Internet is a novel
concept, the issue of knowledge has to be addressed. It seems
impractical to contemplate implementing a training programme
for an entire voting population. Instead we included, along
with the messages that we did test, step-by-step instructions
how to verify a vote using a smartphone app. Voter training,
as a specific behaviour-change category, was thus excluded.
There is evidence in the psychological literature that sug-
gests both rewards and penalties may be counter-productive
[23], [9], [10]. The general view is that humans are not
machines that can be easily controlled merely by a carrot
or a stick. Pink [45] has shown, and replicated this finding
in countries worldwide, that rewards usually lead to worse
performance, not improved motivation, and have negligible
impact in terms of behavioural change. Penalties are similarly
flawed. Even in countries that use the severest possible penalty,
i.e. the death penalty, there is no evidence that it reduces crime
[35], thus we do not expect it to be efficacious in a voting
2Thus we did not consider research on persuasion using technology e.g.
[21].
context. In verifiable voting, understanding is seen to trump
rewards and penalties. In a game-theoretic experiment reported
in [38], participants were were offered monetary incentives in
order to motivate them to post their vote receipt, and their
earnings deducted as a penalty if any other participant correctly
guessed their vote from the posted receipt. The financial
incentives were shown to be insufficient motivation for those
participants who did not understand that the receipt did not
reveal their vote. Additionally, in this work we evaluated only
the cast as intended verifiability step, which cannot be observed
to determine whether or not a voter truly verified. Hence the
use of rewards and penalties was excluded.
2) Included Messages: We iteratively designed messages
using the remaining three behaviour-change categories: risk,
norms and analogy. The messages were prepared in English
and translated into German for the survey. As each message
was based on a different theory, emphasizing different aspects,
their lengths differed.
a) Risk: Communicating risk is potentially useful since
risk has obvious threat connotations [32]. Overplaying the
risks, however, can inhibit precautionary behaviour as people
prefer to deny it, and do not engage in precautionary actions
such as verifying [32], [69]. Huang et al. [25] report that
awareness of threats was effective in motivating users to
carry out necessary security steps in other contexts. Thus, we
designed a risk message, emphasizing an existing threat and
what the voter should do to avoid it. The risk message is shown
below:
Studies by the Federal Office for Information Secu-
rity show that most PCs or laptops with Internet
access are infected with malicious software, e.g.
viruses. This malicious software could change your
vote before encrypting 3 and sending it to the election
server, and you would not notice it. You can use
the Election Verifying App to check if there is any
malicious software on your PC or laptop that has
changed your vote.
We selected the threat of malicious software on the voter’s
PC [33]. The message included a coping strategy, since this is
a necessary adjunct to a risk appeal [4], [27].
b) Norms: Norms have been shown to be effective in
promoting desirable behaviour [52], as they give information
about what is typically approved or disapproved of in a society
[14]. Anderson and Agarwal [4] found a descriptive norm to
be effective in motivating users to carry out security-related
behaviours. Cialdani et al. [15] indicate that norms are more
likely to influence behaviour when they are the main focus
of a message. Consequently, we designed the brief descriptive
norm message shown below:
Voters who want to protect democracy check if the
voting system has correctly encrypted the selected
candidates.
c) Analogies: Curtis and Reigeluth [17] tested the use
of analogies in written text. They argue that such analogies
should consist of a concrete vehicle (in this case paper-based
3While we refer to ‘encryption’ the German term used for the study
translates to ‘coding’.
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voting) and an abstract topic (in this case storage of a vote
somewhere in cyberspace). They point out that this link will
somehow force the reader to deploy their previously estab-
lished cognitive strategy without further explanation. Shapiro
[54] argues that analogies could make new information more
concrete and understandable. Duit [19] references a number of
studies to substantiate the constructivist perspective: that we
learn because we build on previous knowledge. Using explicit
analogies can therefore ease this process.
The analogy-based message establishes a link between a
voter ensuring that their ballot is correct from when they select
the candidates to when it is safely stowed in the sealed ballot
box, and verifying the vote using the election verifying app.
You have previously voted in several elections. When-
ever you participated in an election, you voted on a
ballot paper that was counted manually. You could
be sure that your ballot paper was correct because
you were the one who put a cross next to your
candidate’s name, folded the ballot paper and placed
it in the ballot box. In Internet voting, you put a
cross next to your candidate’s name by clicking on
the candidate. Your vote is then encrypted on your
PC or laptop and is sent to the election server. The
Election Verifying App enables you to ensure that
your vote was not modified before encryption.
d) Summary: The rest of the paper will refer to the
Risk, Norm, and Analogy messages as motivating messages,
the instructions how to verify a vote as instructions, and the
combination of both the messages and instructions as voter
communication. In the survey, which we describe in Section
III, the control group only received the instructions without
any motivational message, while the three experimental groups
received the instructions accompanied by a motivational mes-
sage. Figure 1 summarizes the experiment.
Fig. 1. Experiment
III. TESTING THE BEHAVIOUR-CHANGE MESSAGES
We first present the study hypotheses, and then give an
overview of the survey carried out to evaluate the motivating
messages.
A. Study Hypotheses
We anticipate that the motivating messages will have an
effect such that respondents who receive them are likely to
indicate an increased intention to verify than respondents in the
control group, who only receive the instructions how to verify.
Furthermore, the threat conveyed by the risk message, using
norms to focus respondents’ attention on “typical” behaviour,
and using analogies and past experiences with voting to
introduce new information on verifying, are each individually
hypothesized to increase intention to verify as compared to the
control group. The hypothesis is:
H1: The motivating messages will increase intention to
verify as compared to the control group.
This is divided into three sub-hypotheses:
H1r, H1n, H1a: The Risk, Norm and Analogy messages will
increase intention to verify as compared to the control group.
The behaviour-change literature indicates the potential neg-
ative effects of risk appeals – they can lead to denial or
avoidance [37]. The risk message articulates the threats that
face Internet voting. As a result, this message might reduce
respondents’ intention to vote online. The norm message, on
the other hand, aims to motivate respondents to verify by
stating that this action is somehow expected. To the extent
that the norm message is perceived by respondents as limiting
their freedom to act as they choose with respect to verifying,
we hypothesize that it might reduce respondents’ intention to
vote online. The analogy message emphasizes to a greater
extent than any of the other messages that the voter now has to
take extra steps in comparison to paper-based voting. Thus, we
hypothesize that the extra effort puts voters off online voting.
The second hypothesis is:
H2: The motivating messages will reduce intention to vote
online as compared to the control group.
This is divided into three sub-hypotheses:
H2r, H2n and H2a: The Risk, Norm and Analogy messages
will reduce intention to vote online as compared to the control
group.
B. Survey Overview
We discuss several considerations that informed our de-
cision to use a survey for data collection, followed by the
content and format of the survey, findings from pilot testing,
and distribution of the survey for data collection.
1) Why We Used a Survey: Laboratory studies in the con-
text of computer security pose several challenges. Participants
sometimes feel safe in the study environment, and therefore
exhibit less cautious behaviour, or give responses they think
the experimenters would prefer [58]. Additionally, on being
informed of the real purpose of a study, especially where
there will be interaction with personal data, e.g. banking
information, users may opt out even though this personal data
may not necessarily be recorded in the course of the study
[61].
The context of this research, voting, makes a laboratory
study challenging as it would require observing a human who
has a right to expect secrecy, since voting is similar to other
security-related behaviours in this respect [66]. We therefore
decided to collect data using a survey, which is an accepted
tool in the security behaviour-change literature. Self-reports
are less than perfect in indicating eventual behaviour, but
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here satisficing seemed the wiser approach since observation
would not be ethical, and given the existing challenges with
laboratory user studies.
2) Format of the Survey: The scenario described to re-
spondents was that they received a brochure from the election
commission in preparation for a federal election. To increase
credibility, we placed the German coat of arms as a logo
on the page. The motivating messages were highlighted in
red and the instructions in yellow, colors similar to those on
the coat of arms. The colours were introduced to eliminate
user errors that were observed during pilot tests and served to
guide respondents on which sections were referred to in the
questions. Correspondingly, questions specific to the different
sections were highlighted in the appropriate color.
3) Content of the Survey: To ensure validity of the study
instrument, we developed questions as recommended by [39]
and adapted the question on intention to verify from [4]. Two
other questions were used to gauge respondents’ evaluation of
the clarity of the voter communication [42], and their ability
to verify a vote [27].
Five-point Likert scales, predominantly used in the liter-
ature, were used to collect responses. A single-item measure
was considered appropriate since the questions asked respon-
dents to describe their reaction to the scenario described im-
mediately prior to the questions [57]. We collected qualitative
data from respondents, to obtain feedback on their responses.
The study questions are shown in Table I, while the instructions
are displayed in Figure 24.
TABLE I. FINAL QUESTIONS IN THE SURVEY
Clarity of voter com-
munication
The information in the voter commu-
nication is: (Very unclear - Very clear)
Intention to verify I am going to use the steps (1 -
9) to check if the system has re-
ally encrypted the selected candidates
(Strongly disagree - Strongly agree)
Ability to verify vote I feel able to carry out the steps (1
- 9) to check if the system has re-
ally encrypted the selected candidates
(Strongly disagree - Strongly agree)
Intention to vote online After answering these questions would
you still cast your vote over the Internet
using your PC or laptop?: (Yes / No /
I don’t know)
4) Pilot Testing: We tested the reliability of the survey
in a series of four pilot tests with nine respondents dur-
ing the study design phase. Further, to validate the data
collected, we asked the pilot testers to evaluate the clarity
of the voter communication. Modifications were made from
feedback obtained, centering around improving the wording
and presentation of the information to enhance appearance, and
to reduce confusion with the different sections and questions.
4For legibility of the image, we have not highlighted the instructions as in
the actual survey.
Security of Internet Voting (Voting on your home PC/laptop) 
How can I check that my vote is cast as I intended? 





1. Install an Election Verifying App provided by the 
election commission, or any of the involved verifiability 
institutes, onto your smart phone. 
2. Visit the internet voting website and mark your 
preferred selection with a cross. 
 
 
3. Review your ballot. If the selection is correct, confirm it 
by clicking on the button “Encrypt the Ballot”. 
 
 
4. A QR code will be displayed by the voting web page. 







5. Take a picture of the QR code using the Verifying App 
on your smart phone. 
 
6. Click on the button “Cast as Intended?” displayed on 
the voting web page. 
 
 
7. A second QR code will be displayed 
Info: Second QR Code                                                   
 
  
8. Take a picture of the second QR code using the 
Verifying App on your smart phone. 
 
Info: The app will inform you about the result (cast as 
intended or not) and the selection contained in the vote. 
 
 9. Confirm that the selection displayed by the app on the 
smart phone is what you selected. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Instructions how to verify
5) Distributing the Survey: The questionnaire was dis-
tributed on paper and online, via mailing lists, to staff5 and
students (both undergraduate and graduate) from two universi-
ties, a technical university and a university of applied sciences.
They worked or studied in different departments including
literature and languages, computer science, engineering and
architecture. With this approach we drew a purposive sample
[62] thus gaining insight into the possible verifying behaviour
of smartphone owners who intend to vote over the Internet for
federal elections.
Demographic questions were asked first as some were
used to exclude ineligible respondents, ensuring that particular
conditions were controlled. Only respondents who owned a
smartphone, were German citizens and thus eligible to vote in
federal elections, and who expressed an intention to vote over
the Internet if the opportunity was provided, were recruited.
The scenario in the survey described how voters would use
a smartphone app to verify their votes in a federal election
conducted over the Internet. The motivating message to verify
an Internet vote is unlikely to influence voters who do not
intend to cast an Internet vote.
Further demographic data was collected on respondents’
gender, education level, and computer proficiency level (eval-
uated by whether they personally installed software on their
computer or needed help to do so). Respondents read the
scenario information, followed by the motivating message, and
the instructions, before answering the final set of questions
shown in Table I. Respondents in the control group only read
the instructions before proceeding to the final questions.
5We were careful to contact and approach not only researchers at the uni-
versities, but administrative and support staff as well, for example secretaries
and canteen staff.
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6) Demographics: We collected data from 134 respon-
dents, with approximately 30 respondents in each group.
Similar research has shown robust results with fewer respon-
dents (e.g. [18], [40]). Eleven respondents did not complete
the questionnaire, leaving 123 respondents in total: 54 male
(43.9%) and 69 female (56.1%). The majority of respondents
were under the age of 30. Most were pursuing or had acquired
university education, and had medium or high levels of exper-
tise with computers, specifically, installing software on their
own computers (medium), or helping others to do so (high).
The demographic data is shown in Table II.
TABLE II. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR RESPONDENTS IN THE FOUR
GROUPS
Risk (N=32) Norm (N=30) Analogy (N=31) Control (N=30)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Gender
Male 56.3 50 38.7 30
Female 43.8 50 61.3 70
Age
Average age 25.9 28.1 30.2 26.2
Education
Non-college training 6.3 6.7 - 16.7
College training 34.4 23.3 38.7 53.3
University Education 59.4 70 61.3 30
Computer Proficiency
Low 6.3 6.7 6.5 20
Medium 46.9 46.7 45.2 40
High 46.9 46.7 48.4 40
7) Data Analysis: Statistical tests were carried out using R
version 3.0.1. Free-text responses were translated into English
for analysis and reporting. A random sample was back- and
forward-translated for consistency. Qualitative data analysis
was carried out using the Grounded Theory Method [60] which
has wide application in the analysis of qualitative data. We
analyzed open responses to identify codes using spread sheets.
Both descriptive codes (i.e. codes summarizing responses)
and in-vivo codes (i.e. codes taken directly from responses)
were used. Both approaches facilitated discussion among the
authors, while in-vivo codes have the advantage of rooting the
data in the respondents’ language [48]. We coded responses to
each question sequentially, that is, coding responses to the first
question, before moving to the second question, and so on. We
reviewed the data to identify emerging themes, and grouped
the codes under relevant themes. The codes and themes were
discussed iteratively by two of the authors.
8) Ethical Issues: Guidelines on ethical issues regarding
research involving humans are provided by an ethics commis-
sion at the study university. The relevant requirements for this
research relating to respondent consent and data privacy were
satisfied. Respondents first read a pre-study sheet in which
they were assured that their data would not be linked to their
identity and that the responses would only be used for study
purposes. Additionally, we designed a mild risk message which
was not likely to induce any anxiety in the respondents.
IV. RESULTS
We first show that there is no significant difference in
the clarity of the voter communication or the respondents’
evaluation of their ability to verify based on the instructions.
Moving to the main results, we report on the effect of the
messages on respondents’ intention to verify, and highlight
insights from the qualitative data. We then turn to the effect
of the messages on respondents’ intention to vote online. As
the data was not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk tests), we
applied non-parametric statistical tests.
A. Clarity of the Voter Communication and Ability to Verify
The majority of respondents in all four groups indicated
that the voter communication was clear. A Kruskal-Wallis test
revealed that there were no significant differences between the
groups (p > 0.05). Additionally, the majority of respondents
felt that they were able to verify their votes. There were no
significant differences between the groups (p > 0.05). Both
these results are displayed in Table III. As expected, we ob-
served a significant positive correlation between respondents’
evaluation of their ability to verify the vote and their intention
to verify (Pearson’s R = 0.462, p < 0.05).
TABLE III. CLARITY OF COMMUNICATION AND ABILITY TO VERIFY
Risk (%) Norm (%) Analogy (%) Control (%)
Clarity: Clear/very clear 78 60 84 67
Ability to verify: Agree/strongly agree 94 93 94 83
B. The Effect on Intention to Verify
The risk, norm and analogy messages were all observed
to increase respondents’ intention to verify. We first examined
whether, overall, the messages had an effect on intention to ver-
ify, comparing the treatment groups to the control group. There
were significant differences between the treatment groups (N
= 93) and the control group (N = 30), based on a Mann-
Whitney’s U test (H1: U = 1280, p < 0.05, effect size r = 0.45).
The differences are illustrated in Figure 3. The hypothesis that
the motivating messages will increase intention to verify as
compared to the control group (H1) is thus supported.
Fig. 3. Overall effect of messages compared to control group
We then tested for significant differences between the indi-
vidual messages and the control group as shown in Figure 4. A
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant differences between
the messages (p > 0.05). Thus H1r, H1n and H1a are not
supported, that is, the Risk, Norm and Analogy messages
did not increase intention to verify as compared to the
control group.
Respondents’ open responses were evaluated for reasons
why they would verify.
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Fig. 4. Intent to verify the vote
1) Reasons for Verifying: The main themes that emerged
were feelings of security or insecurity, verifying as a precau-
tion and the effort involved in verifying. While these themes
showed variation between the groups, we first report on the
overarching reasons.
Within the first overarching theme, security and insecurity,
we found numerous abstract comments that verifying gave a
sense of security. The security of verifying was also doubted,
particularly on technical grounds:
‘If I don’t trust the procedure I won’t use it.’
Respondents also stated that they would verify as a pre-
cautionary measure. This was particularly the case for the
treatment groups where between 32% (risk and norm groups)
and 29% (analogy group) of those intending to verify gave this
reason, compared to only 8% in the control group.
The amount of effort respondents perceived to be required
emerged as a reason why they would not verify. This was
observed across the groups and respondents mostly evaluated
the process as cumbersome or time consuming.
However, we also observed an accepting attitude, that if
verifiability is provided one should simply use it:
‘If there is a possibility to check your vote, you
should use it.’
One interesting point that came up across the groups was
that respondents indicated they might only verify initially, out
of curiosity. Some expected to trust over the long term.
‘Perhaps at the first time. After some elections I will
probably not check my vote so often.’
2) Risk Group: In the risk group, we observed more
responses that related to the (technical) risk aspects when
respondents justified why they would verify:
‘I want to be sure that my vote was transmitted
correctly.’
The technical precaution was even seen to offset the
additional effort:
‘It is a good safeguard that takes no more time than
going to the polling station ...’
Conversely, respondents who would not verify also re-
lated more often to security aspects – for example, regarding
whether verifying is necessary or whether the procedure is
actually secure:
‘I trust that my PC is free from malware.’
‘... it remains to be seen whether the used encryption
is secure enough.’
While an evaluation of the respondents’ computer profi-
ciency levels and their intent to verify was not significant, we
noted that two respondents in the risk group, who reported
high computer proficiency levels, did not believe the message
and indicated that they would not verify.
3) Norm Group: For the norm group, precaution was
less focused on the technical safeguard, and more on the
importance of the election:
‘I want to have the certainty that everything is
all right (with an important decision such as an
election).’
Interestingly, we also found that some respondents took
offense at the norm message, with one commenting:
‘It feels like an allegation if I don’t do it.’
4) Analogy Group: Respondents in the analogy group also
often stated precaution as their reason to verify, but here more
related to actual events:
‘You can’t be too careful. The incidents in the USA
in the past show that control is better.’
They also related to the act of voting itself:
‘I want to make sure that I have voted for the right
candidate and have not made any mistakes.’
C. The Effect on Intention to Vote Online
A number of respondents in all four groups indicated that
they would either not vote over the Internet, or they were not
sure that they would do so. Chi-square tests revealed that these
results were not significantly different between the groups. H2
is thus not supported, the same holds for H2r, H2n and H2a,
that is, the motivating messages did not reduce intention to
vote online as compared to the control group, neither did
the Risk, Norm and Analogy messages reduce intention to
vote online as compared to the control group.
V. DISCUSSION
The goal of this work was to determine whether motivating
messages would increase German voters’ intention to verify
the integrity of votes. We tested a specific scenario where
verifying is done using a smartphone app. Our results show
that motivating messages do significantly influence intention to
verify. All three messages were observed to make a positive
difference.
Importantly, our results also show that the interventions did
not negatively affect voters’ intention to vote online. These
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findings are relevant in the context of verifiable voting, where
currently verifiability is either not communicated [63], or
voters are simply instructed to verify.
Our results do not identify one specific message as being
more effective than the others. This could be as a result of the
relatively small variation in the messages. For ethical reasons,
we could only design a mild risk message, and while a stronger
risk message may have led to greater variation, it cannot
feasibly be used in practice.
Some observations were made on the effect of the mes-
sages based on the responses given. Most respondents reacted
positively to the analogy message although it was somewhat
contrived. There is really no close parallel between paper-
based and electronic voting. Much that happens electronically
is very difficult to make visible. The risk message, on the
other hand, may have heightened respondents’ awareness of
possible threats but some respondents felt that it overstated
the case. Interestingly, we noted from the open responses
that it did not seem to motivate respondents who reported
high levels of computer proficiency. Instead, they countered
by saying that they trusted their PC or thought the described
threat unlikely. Similar responses in the security context have
been documented, e.g. [5] found that participants who were
confident in their ability to carry out tasks on the computer
showed low interest in carrying out recommended security
actions. The norm message rather unexpectedly seemed to
offend some respondents. This may be because they felt that
it challenged their freedom to choose whether or not to verify
the vote.
This study does face some limitations. The sample that
was recruited is not representative of the entire German voting
population. However, we do obtain insight on the effect of
motivating messages on the verifying behaviour of smartphone
owners who intend to vote over the Internet. Self-reported data
on intention to verify was collected which may not indicate
actual voter behaviour. While a link between intention and
behaviour in the context of information security has been
demonstrated [65], this is often not the case. Behavioural
intention has been identified as an antecedent to actual be-
haviour [34]. Additionally, using a laboratory user study to
observe actual behaviour faces related challenges: what is
observed may not mirror the participant’s genuine behaviour
when unobserved. In remote voting, the voter expects to be in
an environment of their choosing, to be unobserved, and for
their vote to remain secret and their actions unobserved. Thus,
any data collected by observation in a laboratory user study is
unlikely to be natural behaviour.
VI. CONCLUSION
Internet voting continues to gain ground, with verifiable
voting systems offering a mechanism for voters to verify
the integrity of their votes on the voting platform. However,
since extra effort is required from the voter, they do need
to be motivated to carry out the necessary verifiability steps.
Our study found that providing motivating messages, along
with instructions on how to verify, is significantly effective
in increasing intention to verify. Given that we identified
a medium effect size [16], we consider the findings to be
sufficiently compelling to justify further study in order to
confirm the efficacy of motivational messages. This is planned
for future work.
Since the survey was distributed in Germany, it would be
necessary to test the impact of motivational messages in other
countries. There is scope for extending this research using
other message formulations which rely on different behaviour-
change theories. As an example, messages can be designed for
a long-term effect, as some respondents stated that they would
only verify at the onset. Messages based on morality have been
reported to have a long-term effect [64] and their use can be
explored. Further, differently-worded norm messages can be
explored.
While we only examined the potential negative effect of
the motivating messages on voters’ intention to vote online,
other possible consequences, both negative and positive, can
be explored. For example, the messages might well impact
voters’ trust in the voting system in general.
There may be a need to provide voters with information
on how security in its entirety is catered for, not only about
how integrity of the vote is assured. While voters, especially
those with high technical expertise, may be interested in more
security information, an open question is how this can best be
presented to the general populace. The effectiveness of video
and text in risk communication has been investigated by [8]
who find that videos are more effective. Jenkins et al. [26]
report that lean media (i.e. textual communication as developed
in this work) are also appropriate. This will be explored further
to determine the best approach for application.
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